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Abstract
“Guess Who?” is a popular two player game where players ask “Yes”/“No” questions to search for
their opponent’s secret identity from a pool of possible candidates. This is modeled as a simple stochastic
game. Using this model, the optimal strategy is explicitly found. Contrary to popular belief, performing
a binary search is not always optimal. Instead, the optimal strategy for the player who trails is to make
certain bold plays in an attempt catch up. This is discovered by first analyzing a continuous version of
the game where players play indefinitely and the winner is never decided after finitely many rounds.
1 Introduction
“Guess Who?” is a zero-sum two player game where players take turns asking “Yes” or “No” questions to find
their opponent’s secret identity [12]. Each player keeps track of a finite pool of possible candidates for their
opponent’s secret identity. Players alternate turns asking a “Yes” or “No” question (that their opponent must
answer truthfully) about their opponent’s identity and reduce their pool of possible candidates. For example,
if Player 1 asks: “Does your character have blue eyes?” and Player 2 answers “No”, Player 1 eliminates all
candidates in his pool that have blue eyes. Eventually, only one candidate remains in the pool and this last
character must be their opponent’s secret identity! The first player to narrow their pool down to a single
character in this way wins the game.
To model this game mathematically we will make the following assumptions:
• The secret identity of the opponent is uniformly distributed amongst all possible candidates. Because
of the eliminating nature of the “Yes”/“No” questions, this property persists throughout the game. With
this assumption, only the number of remaining characters in the pool is relevant to the analysis, not
the details of which characters in particular are remaining.
• For any candidate pool size n and any 1 ≤ b ≤ n − 1, it is always possible to construct a question for
which exactly b candidates correspond to the “Yes” answer. One way to do this is to sort the candidates
alphabetically and ask “Does your character’s name come alphabetically before ?” where the name
is chosen to be the name which is b-th on the list. We use the terminology a “bid of size b” for such
a “Yes”/“No” question.
With these assumptions, “Guess Who?” can be modeled as a so called simple stochastic game as defined
by Condon [2]. The strategy of the game is in choosing the bid size. Players can balance risk vs. reward on
each turn by varying their bid size. The bid b = 1 is a risky play: it gives a small chance to win the game
immediately but is more likely to reduce the candidate pool by only 1. In contrast, a bid of b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
is the
least risky bid. The main result of this article is to find the optimal bidding strategy for “Guess Who” and
prove that it is optimal:
Theorem 1.1. (Optimal Strategy and Optimal Probabilities for “Guess Who?”) When it is Player 1’s turn,
if Player 1 has n candidates in their pool and Player 2 has m candidates in their pool, then Player 1 has the
following optimal strategy:
• If n ≥ 2k+1 + 1 while 2k + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2k+1 for some k ∈ N ∪ {0}, then Player 1 is in the weeds and
must make a bold move to catch up! Their optimal play is a bid of b∗(n,m) = 2k = 2blog2(m−1)c and
the probability Player 1 wins if both players play optimally is:
p?(n,m) =
2k+1
n
− 2
3
· 2
2k+1 + 1
nm
. (1.1)
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• If 2k+1 ≤ n ≤ 2k+1 while m ≥ 2k+1 for some k ∈ N∪{0}, then Player 1 has the upper hand and can
stay ahead by making a low risk play! Their optimal play is a bid of b∗(n,m) =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
and the probability
Player 1 wins if both players play optimally is:
p?(n,m) = 1− 2
k
m
+
2
3
· 2
2k + 2
nm
. (1.2)
The proof of Theorem 1.1 is provided in Section 4, and goes by solving a recurrence relation that p?(n,m)
satisfies. Figure 1 shows a plot of Player 1’s probability of winning as a function of the pool sizes (n,m).
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Figure 1: The probability p?(n,m) of Player 1 winning “Guess Who?” on their turn when Player 1 has n
candidates in their pool and Player 2 has m candidates in their pool
1.1 Bold Plays
It is an elementary entropy calculation that the safe bid b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
will minimize the expected number of
“Yes”/”No” questions for Player 1. This is not the optimal strategy in “Guess Who?” because Player 1 does
not want to minimize this expected value: instead he wants to maximize the probability of getting there
before Player 2 does. This race against the opponent is what drives the optimal bidding behavior when
Player 1 is significantly behind his opponent. When this happens, Player 1’s optimal strategy is a bold bid,
b = 2blog2(m−1)c which depends only on Player 2’s (!) remaining pool, and is always strictly <
⌊
1
2n
⌋
. This
has a low probability of success (always strictly< 12 ) but would put Player 1 back in the running if he were
lucky.
The concept of risky plays with big payoffs in stochastic games has a rich history. A classic example is the
single player casino game red-and-black when playing against a subfair casino studied by Dubins and Savage
[3]. There is also a two player version of red-and-black, where players try to bankrupt each other, which has
also been studied by Secchi [8], and adapted by Pontiggia [7]. Still more variations are studied more recently
by Chen and Hsiau [1]. In all these examples, the authors find when bold plays are optimal.
Another example, more similar to “Guess Who?”, is the two player dice game “Pig” where players race to
100 points while managing risk vs. reward on each of their turns. Without the complication of racing against
the opponent, Haigh and Roters [5] are able to conduct exact analysis. A game-show version where the
players play simultaneously has also been studied by [10]. However, the interplay between two racing players
complicates things. Neller and Presser [6] have numerically calculated the optimal strategy in situations
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where both players have < 100 points using dynamical programming techniques, but there is no known
simple description of the optimal strategy like we have for “Guess Who?”. The optimal strategy to “Guess
Who?” in Theorem 1.1 is satisfying because we can find a simple exact solution on how and when to play
boldly.
1.2 Log Periodicity and “Continuous Guess Who?”
The landscape of the game exhibits a log periodic behavior. In particular for fixed c > 0 , p?(n, cn) does not
converge as n → ∞. Instead it approaches a function which is periodic in log2(n). This kind of behavior is
not uncommon in this kind of stochastic system, for example see group Russian roulette studied by van de
Brug et al. [11] or ties amongst i.i.d. random variables studied by Eisenberg et al. [4]. In “Guess Who?”
there is an asymptotic function p?∞ : R>0 × R>0 → [0, 1] which is exactly log2-periodic in the sense that
p∗∞(2x, 2y) = p
?
∞(x, y) and for which p?(n,m) = p∗∞(n,m) +O
(
1
nm
)
.
This function p?∞ was first discovered as the probability that Player 1 wins a generalized game called
“Continuous Guess Who?” which is introduced and studied in Section 3. This game is more straightforward to
analyze than “Guess Who?” because there are no small number effects. Figure 2 shows a plot of p?∞(2kα, 2kβ)
when (α, β) is in the L shaped region (2,∞)×(1, 2]⋃(1, 2]×(1,∞). The landscape of p?∞ on all of R>0×R>0
can be understood by tiling scaled copies of this L shaped region onto the entire quadrant.
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Figure 2: The probability p?∞(2kα, 2kβ) of Player 1 winning “Continuous Guess Who?” from the position
x = 2kα, y = 2kβ in the region (α, β) ∈ (2,∞)× (1, 2] and (α, β) ∈ (1, 2]× (1,∞). This closely approximates
“Guess Who?” when n,m are large: p?(n,m) = p?∞(n,m) +O(
1
nm ).
This log-periodicity means that if both players start with the same pool size, no matter how large, Player
1 will always have a significant first turn advantage. If he plays optimally he will win with a probability
between 58 and
2
3 , depending on the particular starting size. It would be more fair to start Player 1 with a
larger pool of candidates to offset his advantage from playing first. The fair way to do this is enlarge his
starting pool by a factor between 43 and
3
2 .
1.3 Real World Applications
Even though “Guess Who?” is an abstract game, the key features of the game are more broadly applicable:
• Players are racing to reach a specific goal and get nothing for a second place finish.
• The progress of both players toward the goal is public knowledge.
• Players have the ability to balance risk vs reward on the speed of progress toward the goal.
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In terms of these features, “Guess Who?” can be thought of as a toy model of some situations where two firms
are competing to be the first to bring a product to market and have the ability to manage risk vs reward on
the time it takes for product development. Our analysis suggests that the leading firm should take no risks
(i.e. try only to minimize expected development time) and the trailing firm should take the smallest risk
possible catch up to the leading firm.
An example from history is the space race between the US and Soviet Union. After Apollo 8 became the
first manned mission to orbit the Moon in December 1968, the Soviet Union went forward with a launch of
its N1 rocket to attempt lunar orbit in February 1969 despite warnings from engineers on the low probability
of mission success. The rocket catastrophically failed, but nevertheless the Soviet Union quickly scrambled
for another attempt in July 1969, just 13 days before the launch of Apollo 11. The rocket exploded only 23
seconds after launch and resulted in the largest non-nuclear man-made explosion of all time. Clearly, the
Soviet Union was trying to increase the speed of development at the price of increased risk. They knew that
taking risks was the best way to maximize the chance of catching up.
2 The Model
Definition 2.1. Mathematician’s “Guess Who” is a game between two players played on the statespace:
S = {〈n,m,Pi〉 : n ∈ N,m ∈ N, i ∈ {1, 2}} . (2.1)
The first entry indicates the number of people remaining in Player 1’s pool of possible candidates for Player
2’s mystery character. (This is the number of characters who have not yet been removed from consideration
through previous questions.) The second entry indicates the same thing for Player 2. The last token, either
P1 or P2 indicates whose turn it is to play. Players alternate turns.
If the last token is P1, it is Player 1’s turn. On his turn, from the state 〈n,m,P1〉, Player 1 makes a bid
b1 ∈ [1, n − 1] ∩ N. This represents a “Yes-No” question that Player 1 may ask Player 2 about his hidden
character. b1 represents the size of the set of “Yes” answers. Once Player 1 has selected his bid, the game
state evolves stochastically according to the following rules:
Starting at 〈n,m,P1〉 with Player 1 bidding b1 →
{
〈b1,m, P2〉 with probability b1n
〈n− b1,m, P2〉 with probability n−b1n
.
This reflects the fact that Player 2’s mystery character is uniformly distributed in the pool of characters.
From this state, it is Player 2’s turn. Player 2 makes a bid b2 ∈ [1,m− 1]∩N, and the state space evolves in
the same way:
From 〈n′,m, P2〉 with Player 2 bidding b2 →
{
〈n′, b, P1〉 with probability b2m
〈n′,m− b2, P1〉 with probability m−b2m
.
All random chances in this game are independent of one another. Afterward it is Player 1’s turn again and
play repeats. Players continue in this way until either player reduces his pool of candidates to exactly 1.
When this happens that player immediately wins.1 That is to say that the following states are terminal
states for the game:
∀m > 1, 〈1,m, P2〉 ↔ Player 1 immediately wins
∀n > 1, 〈n, 1, P1〉 ↔ Player 2 immediately wins.
The state 〈1, 1, Pi〉 is undefined because there is no way to reach this state without first passing through one
of the previously defined terminal states.
Remark 2.2. Definition 2.1 puts the game of “Guess Who?” in the framework of a Simple Stochastic Game
as defined by Condon [2]. These are also sometimes called 2 12 -player games, where in addition to Player 1
and Player 2, the randomness in the game is thought of as 12 of a player. Because of the randomness inherent
in these games there is no strategy for either player that guarantees victory. (Indeed, in “Guess Who?”, the
opponent can always make a bid of 1, and if they are lucky, will immediately win.)
1In some versions of “Guess Who?”, players are required to make an additional “special” final guess, even if they have already
reduced the pool to a single individual. We do not consider this rule set here.
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Definition 2.3. The theory of simple stochastic games going back to Shapley [9] and Condon [2] show the
existence of an optimal bidding strategy we will denote by b? : N×N→ N and an optimal probability function
we will denote by p? : N× N→ [0, 1] that is optimal for Player 1 in the sense that2:
• If Player 1 makes a bid of b?(n,m) whenever the state 〈n,m,P1〉 is encountered, then no matter what
strategy Player 2 chooses, Player 1 wins with probability ≥ p?(n,m).
• If Player 1 uses any other bidding strategy whatsoever at the state 〈n,m,P1〉, then Player 2 has a
strategy that ensures that Player 1 wins with probability ≤ p?(n,m).
When both players play their optimal strategies, Player 1 will win with probability exactly p?(n,m).
Since “Guess Who?” is symmetric between Player 1 and Player 2 (in the sense that the position 〈n,m,P1〉
is functionally identical to the position 〈m,n, P2〉), the optimal bidding function for Player 2 from 〈n,m,P2〉
is b?(m,n) and Player 2’s optimal probability to win from 〈n,m,P2〉 is p?(m,n). By the same token, Player
1’s probability to win from 〈n,m,P2〉 is 1− p?(m,n) since Player 1 wins if and only if Player 2 loses. Both
players strategies and bids can be encapsulated in a single function. Without loss of generality then, we will
thus normally take the point of view of Player 1 in our analysis. Because of this symmetry, the optimal
probability function satisfies a nice recurrence relation:
Proposition 2.4. p?(n,m) and b?(n,m) satisfy the following recurrence relation:
p?(n,m) = max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
p?(m, b)− n− b
n
p?(m,n− b)
}
(2.2)
b?(n,m) = arg max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
p?(m, b)− n− b
n
p?(m,n− b)
}
. (2.3)
(For the case the argmax is not unique: any b that maximizes the function will work for Player 1’s optimal
strategy)
Proof. Let pb(n,m) be the probability that Player 1 wins from the position 〈n,m,P1〉 if he bids b at
〈n,m,P1〉 and both players play optimally thereafter. By the rules of the game pb(n,m) = bn (1− p?(m,n))+
n−b
n (1− p?(m,n− b)) since with probability bn we move to the position 〈b,m, P2〉 where Player 1’s probabil-
ity to win is 1− p?(m,n) and with probability n−bn we move to the position 〈n− b,m, P2〉 where Player 1’s
probability to win is 1− p?(m,n− b).
It must be that p?(n,m) = maxb∈[1,n−1] pb(n,m) since Player 1 must bid some value of b at the position
〈n,m,P1〉, and the optimal strategy is no worse than any fixed bid b. Similarly, any b? that has pb?(n,m) =
p?(n,m) means that bidding b? at the position 〈n,m,P1〉 is an optimal bid.
Remark 2.5. “Guess Who?” has a nice structure because the sum s = n+m is a strictly decreasing function
as the game progresses. Indeed, this sum is guaranteed to decrease by at least 1 on each players turn. This
observation, along with the initial data ∀m > 1, p?(1,m) = 1 and ∀n > 1, p?(n, 1) = 0, mean that p?(n,m),
b?(n,m) can be explicitly computed inductively by the very simple Algorithm 1 given below3. At each stage
s, the algorithm has already computed p?(n,m) for all pairs (n,m) with n+m ≤ s− 1. The values p?(m, b)
and p?(m,n− b) which appear in the maximization have m+ b ≤ s− 1 and m+ (n− b) since 1 ≤ b ≤ n− 1
and m+ n = s, and are hence already known. The proof of the main Theorem 1.1 also uses this observation
as part of a proof by induction. The output when r = 64 is displayed in Figure 1 for 1 ≤ n,m ≤ 32.
Algorithm 1 Numerically computing p?(n,m) and b?(n,m).
Input: r ≥ 3 Output: The value p?(n,m) and b?(n,m) for all pairs (n,m) with 3 ≤ n+m ≤ r
0. Initialize p?(1,m) = 1 for all m > 1 and p?(n, 1) = 0 for all n > 1
1. for s = 3 to r:
2. for (n,m) with n+m = s:
3. p?(n,m)←maxb∈[1,n−1]
{
1− bnp?(m, b)− n−bn p?(m,n− b)
}
4. b?(n,m)← argmaxb∈[1,n−1]
{
1− bnp?(m, b)− n−bn p?(m,n− b)
}
2This function p?(n,m) is sometimes called the value of the node 〈n,m, P1〉 and the strategy b? is called a positional strategy
since it depends only on the current position.
3Note that for some (n,m) the value b?(n,m) is not unique and will depend on how argmax is implemented.
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2.1 “In the weeds” and “the upper hand”
We now divide the statespace S into some subsets which turn out to be relevant for discussing the optimal
strategy in the game. Except for the trivial states where n = 1 or m = 1, these subsets partition the entire
statespace S in the sense that each element of the statespace is in exactly one of the subsets. This division
was discovered by careful examination of the output of Algorithm 1.
Definition 2.6. For k ∈ N ∪ {0}, define the set Wk,P1 ⊂ S by:
Wk,P1 :=
{〈n,m,P1〉 : 2k+1 < n and 2k < m ≤ 2k+1} . (2.4)
When 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1 , we say that Player 1 is in the weeds at level k, or if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈
⋃∞
k=0Wk,P1we
say Player 1 is in the weeds without specifying which level. Similarly, Wk,P2 :={〈n,m,P2〉 : 2k+1 < m and 2k < n ≤ 2k+1} and we use the same terminology for Player 2.
Definition 2.7. For k ∈ N ∪ {0}, define the set Uk,P1 ⊂ S by:
Uk,P1 :=
{〈n,m,P1〉 : 2k < n ≤ 2k+1 and 2k < m} . (2.5)
When 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1 , we say that Player 1 has the upper hand at level k, or if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈⋃∞
k=0 Uk,P1we say Player 1 has the upper hand without specifying which level. Similarly, Uk,P2 :={〈n,m,P2〉 : 2k < m ≤ 2k+1 and 2k < n} and we use the same terminology for Player 2.
With these two definitions solidified, the description of the optimal strategy for the game is very simple:
players should bid 2k when in the weeds at level k and should bid
⌊
1
2n
⌋
when they have the upper hand.
3 “Continuous Guess Who?”
The exact formula in Theorem 1.1 is proven by induction, which does does not shed much light on how the
formula is discovered or what the individual terms in it represent. To aid understanding, we present the
original method that led to the formula p?(n,m). From numerically computing p?(n,m) and b?(n,m) for
some small values of n,m using Algorithm 1, we get an ansatz on the optimal bidding strategy b?(n,m).
We then exactly calculate the probability for either player to win when they follow this bidding ansatz in
a modified version of “Guess Who?” which is defined in such a way to remove small number effects. The
probability of winning in this modified game turns out to be a good approximation to the probability of
winning in “Guess Who?” in the asymptotic regime when the pool sizes n,m are very large, and this is what
first led to the formula p?(n,m).
Definition 3.1. “Continuous Guess Who?” is a two player game on the statespace:
S∞ =
{〈x, y, Pi〉 : x ∈ R>0, y ∈ R>0, i ∈ {1, 2}} . (3.1)
The partition of the statespace into “in the weeds” and “the upper hand” are generalized to this continuous
setting by allowing any exponent k ∈ Z:
W∞k,P1 :=
{〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉
: α ∈ (2,∞) and β ∈ (1, 2]} ⊂ S∞, k ∈ Z, (3.2)
U∞k,P1 :=
{〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉
: α ∈ (1, 2] and β ∈ (1,∞)} ⊂ S∞, k ∈ Z. (3.3)
W∞k,P2 , U
∞
k,P2
, k ∈ Z are defined analogously. Play proceeds in a similar way to “Guess Who?”: on Player 1’s
turn, from the state 〈x, y, P1〉, Player 1 is allowed to make any (not necessarily an integer) size bid b1 ∈ (0, x)
and the game state evolves stochastically according to:
Starting at 〈x, y, P1〉 with Player 1 bidding b1 →
{
〈b1, y, P2〉 with probability b1x
〈x− b1, y, P2〉 with probability x−b1x
.
On Player 2’s turn he makes a bid b2 ∈ (0, y) and the game state evolves analogously. All of these random
outcomes are independent.
The game has no ending point: players continue playing indefinitely. Instead, the events {Player 1 loses},
{Player 2 loses}, {The game is a draw} are defined abstractly as events on the underlying probability space.
The event that Player 1 loses is defined to be the event that Player 1 is in the weeds “almost always”; that is
there exists some time beyond which Player 1 is trapped in the weeds forevermore. Player 2 losing is defined
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analogously. The event that the game is a draw is defined to be the event that both players each alternate
being in the weeds infinitely often. Denoting the state of the game after t steps as St ∈ S∞, this is written:
{Player 1 loses} :=
{
∃T such that ∀t > T, St ∈
∞⋃
k=−∞
W∞k,1 on Player 1’s turns
}
{Player 2 loses} :=
{
∃T such that ∀t > T, St ∈
∞⋃
k=−∞
W∞k,2 on Player 2’s turns
}
{The game is a draw} :=
{
St ∈
∞⋃
k=−∞
W∞k,1 i.o. and St ∈
∞⋃
k=−∞
W∞k,2 i.o.
}
.
We define also {Player 2 wins} := {Player 1 loses} and {Player 1 wins} := {Player 2 loses}.
Remark 3.2. “Continuous Guess Who?” is a very peculiar game because of the strange way that winning is
defined. Indeed, the players cannot know if they have won or lost the game after finitely many rounds of the
game. (There is always a positive probability the trailing player will recover and win, no matter how dire
their situation may become.) Practically speaking, one should think of “Continuous Guess Who?” only as a
tool that closely models ordinary “Guess Who?” when the length of the game is very long. In the remaining
analysis in this section, we will show that when both players play according to an optimal bidding ansatz,
the probabilities of winning from any state can be calculated exactly and the probability of a draw is 0.
Definition 3.3 (Optimal Bidding Ansatz). We assume both players play according to the following strategy:
• When Player 1 is in the weeds at level k, 〈2kα, 2kβ, P1〉 ∈W∞k,P1 , Player 1 makes a bid of 2k.
• When Player 1 has the upper hand at level k, 〈x, y, P1〉 ∈ U∞k,P1 , Player 1 makes a bid of 12x.
Player 2 plays analogously. This ansatz was hypothesized by examining output from Algorithm 1.
Definition 3.4. Define p?∞ : R>0 × R>0 → (0, 1) to be the probability that Player 1 wins starting from the
position 〈x, y, P1〉 on his turn when both players play according to the optimal bidding ansatz:
p?∞(x, y) := P (Player 1 wins from 〈x, y, P1〉) . (3.4)
Lemma 3.5. For any j ∈ Z, p?∞(x, y) satisfies:
p?∞(x, y) = p
?
∞
(
2jx, 2jy
)
. (3.5)
Proof. Define the map φ : 〈x, y, Pi〉 →
〈
2jx, 2jy, Pi
〉
and we will show that the winning probability p?∞ is
invariant under the map φ. Notice firstly that φ sends the sets W∞k,Pi →W∞k+j,Pi and U∞k,Pi → U∞k+j,Pi . Thus
this map has no effect on whether Player 1 is in the weeds or has the upper hand. We next observe that
under the optimal bidding ansatz, the probability of a bid being a success is also invariant under the map φ.
Indeed, when Player 1 has the upper hand, he makes a no-risk bid and his pool size is plainly halved; when
Player 1 is in the weeds at level k,
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉 ∈ W∞k,P1 , α > 2, β ∈ (1, 2], he makes a bid of size 2k and
his pool size after the bid is: {
2k with probability 2
k
2kα
2kα− 2k with probability 2kα−2k
2kα
.
The factor 2k cancels, and this probability depends only on α, which is invariant under φ. From the above
considerations we see that if we let St be the state after t rounds started from 〈x, y, P1〉 and we let Rt to be
the state after t rounds started from
〈
2jx, 2jy, P1
〉
, then we have equality in distribution:
Rt
d
= φ (St) .
From this invariance, along with the fact that φ does not change whether or not Player 1 is in the weeds,
and the very definition of Player 1 winning the game, we conclude that p?∞ is invariant under the map φ as
desired.
Lemma 3.6. Assume both players play “Continuous Guess Who?” according to the optimal bidding ansatz.
Suppose we start from the position
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉
with α > 2 and β ∈ (1, 2], so that Player 1 is in the weeds
at level k ∈ Z. Then, the probability that Player 1 ever exits the weeds at any point throughout the game is
2
α
.
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Proof. Since Player 1 is in the weeds at level k, his first bid is 2k. This means that his pool size becomes:{
2k with probability 2
k
2kα
2kα− 2k with probability 2kα−2k
2kα
.
If his pool size becomes 2k, the pool sizes are now x = 2k,y ≥ 2k+1 meaning that Player 1 now has escaped
the weeds and has the upper hand. Thus Player 1 escapes from the weeds on the first guess with probability
2k
2kα
= 1α .
If Player 1 fails to escape the weeds on this turn, his new pool size is 2kα − 2k = 2k−1 (2(α− 1)). At
this stage Player 2 has the upper hand, and will make a bid of exactly 122
kβ and so Player 2’s new pool
size is halved and will be exactly 2k−1β. Thus, if Player 1 fails to escape the weeds at this level, the game
state moves to x = 2k−1 (2(α− 1)) and y = 2k−1β. By Lemma 3.5 the probability of winning is invariant
under changing k, and so this position is handled by the same analysis as above with a new α-value which
is α′ = 2(α − 1). Player 1’s probability to escape the weeds at this stage is 1α′ = 12(α−1) . This analysis can
be repeated over and over again. Finally, to find the probability Player 1 ever escapes the weeds, we sum up
his probability to escape at each stage:
P (Player 1 ever escapes the weeds)
=
1
α
+
(
1− 1
α
)(
1
2(α− 1) +
(
1− 1
2(α− 1)
)(
1
2 (2(α− 1)− 1) + . . .
))
.
Fortunately this expansion telescopes and we remain with:
P (Player 1 ever escapes the weeds)
=
1
α
+
(
α− 1
α
)
1
2(α− 1) +
(
α− 1
α
)(
2(α− 1)− 1
2(α− 1)
)(
1
2(2(α−1)−1)
)
+ . . .
=
1
α
+
1
2α
+
1
4α
+ . . . .
Evaluating this infinite sum gives the desired result of
2
α
.
Next we prove a lemma about the position
〈
2k · 4, 2k · 2, P1
〉
. This position is important because it is
naturally encountered when both players play according to the optimal bidding ansatz.
Lemma 3.7. Assume both players play “Continuous Guess Who?” according to the optimal bidding ansatz.
Starting from the position
〈
2k · 4, 2k · 2, P1
〉
(i.e. α = 4, β = 2), the probability Player 1 loses the game is 23
and the probability of a draw is 0.
Proof. Player 1 can lose the game in one of two disjoint ways:
a) Player 1 never gets out of the weeds. The probability that Player 1 never gets out of the weeds is 1− 24
by Lemma 3.6.
b) Player 1 successfully gets out of the weeds at some point and puts Player 2 in the weeds; then Player
2 himself gets out of the weeds; and finally Player 1 subsequently loses the game from that position. The
probability of this chain of events is calculated as follows: by Lemma 3.6, with probability 24 , Player 1 does
get out of the weeds at some point, and the position will then be x = 2` · 2 and y = 2` · 4 for some `, (i.e.
the game evolves to α′ = 2, β′ = 4). The position must be of this form because Player 2’s total is always a
power of 2 up to this point (he started at a power of 2 and is always halving his pool up to this point) and
Player 1’s bid is the largest power of 2 which is strictly less than Player 2’s pool size. From this new position,
the probability that Player 2 ever gets out of the weeds from this point is 24 by Lemma 3.6. If Player 2 does
successfully get out of the weeds, the position will be x = 2j ·4 and y = 2j ·2 for some j by the same reasoning
as above, (i.e. we the state has evolved back to the original position α′′ = 4, β′′ = 2). Thus we have:
P
(
P1 loses from
〈
2k · 4, 2k · 2, P1
〉)
= P (P1 never escapes) +P (P1 escapes)P (P2 escapes)P
(
P1 loses from 〈2j ·4,2j ·2,P1〉
)
=
(
1− 2
4
)
+
2
4
· 2
4
·P (P1 loses from 〈2j · 4, 2j · 2, P1〉)
=
1
2
+
1
4
P
(
P1 loses from
〈
2j · 4, 2j · 2, P1
〉)
.
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By Lemma 3.5, the positions
〈
2k · 4, 2k · 2, P1
〉
and
〈
2j · 4, 2j · 2, P1
〉
are identical with regard to losing
probability. Solving the linear equation p = 12 +
1
4p gives p =
2
3 , as desired. The probability of a draw is 0
because the probability of switching from one player being in the weeds to the other being in the weeds from
this position has probability 24 each time, and so having infinity many switches is a probability 0 event by
the Borel-Cantelli lemma.
Proposition 3.8. Assume both players play “Continuous Guess Who?” according to the optimal bidding
ansatz. Suppose we are at the position 〈x, y, P1〉 =
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉
with α > 2 and β ∈ (1, 2], so that Player 1
is in the weeds at level k ∈ Z. Then the probability of a draw is 0 and the probability that Player 1 wins the
game is:
p?∞(x, y) =
2k+1
x
− 2
3
22k+1
xy
. (3.6)
Proof. We first calculate the probability that Player 1 loses. As in Lemma 3.7, Player 1 can lose the game
in one of two disjoint ways:
a) Player 1 never gets out of the weeds. The probability that Player 1 never gets out of the weeds is 1− 2α
by Lemma 3.6.
b) Player 1 successfully gets out of the weeds at some point and puts Player 2 in the weeds; then Player
2 himself gets out of the weeds; and finally player Player 1 subsequently loses the game from that position.
If Player 1 does get out of the weeds, the position will be x = 2` · 2 and y = 2` · (2β) for some `, (i.e. the
position evolves to α′ = 2, β′ = 2β). Thus the probability that Player 2 gets out of the weeds from this point
is 22β by Lemma 3.6. If Player 2 does successfully get out of the weeds, the position will be x = 2
j · 4 and
y = 2j · 2 for some j, (i.e. we will be at α′′ = 4, β′′ = 2). We have already analyzed this position in Lemma
3.7. Thus we have:
P
(
P1 loses from
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉)
= P (P1 never escapes) +P (P1 escapes)P (P2 escapes)P
(
P1 loses from 〈2j ·4,2j ·2,P1〉
)
=
(
1− 2
α
)
+
2
α
(
2
2β
)
P
(
P1 loses from
〈
2j · 4, 2j · 2, P1
〉)
=
(
1− 2
α
)
+
2
α
(
2
2β
)
2
3
.
The probability of a draw is 0 since if more than two changes of the upper hand occur, the game passes
through the position
〈
2j · 4, 2j · 2, P1
〉
, from which the probability of a draw is 0 by Lemma 3.7. Finally then,
taking the complement and plugging in x = 2kα, y = 2kβ gives the result.
Proposition 3.9. Assume both players play “Continuous Guess Who?” according to the optimal bidding
ansatz. Suppose we are at the position 〈x, y, P1〉 =
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉
with α ∈ (1, 2] and β > 2, so that Player 1
has the upper hand at level k ∈ Z. Then, the probability of a draw is 0 and the probability that Player 1 wins
the game is:
p?∞(x, y) = 1−
2k
y
+
2
3
22k
xy
. (3.7)
Proof. When Player 1 has the upper hand, he bids exactly 122
kα and puts Player 2 in the weeds. By the
symmetry between Player 1 and Player 2, we use Proposition 3.8 to see the probability of a draw is 0 and to
compute:
P
(
Player 1 wins from state
〈
2kα, 2kβ, P1
〉)
= P
(
Player 1 wins from state
〈
2k−1α, 2k−1 (2β) , P2
〉)
= 1−P (Player 2 wins from state 〈2k−1α, 2k−1 (2β) , P2〉)
= 1−P (Player 1 wins from state 〈2k−1 (2β) , 2k−1α, P1〉)
= 1−
(
2
2β
− 2
2β
(
2
2α
)
2
3
)
.
Plugging in x = 2kα,y = 2kβ gives the result.
Remark 3.10. Despite the difference between “Continuous Guess Who?” and ordinary “Guess Who?”, this
analysis comes remarkably close to the true value p?(n,m) when evaluated at integer values. Indeed we have:
p?(n,m)− p?∞(n,m) =
{
− 23 1nm if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1
4
3
1
nm if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1
. (3.8)
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The corrections − 23 1nm and 43 1nm were found serendipitously by comparing numerical solutions of p? to the
exact formula p?∞. The exact formula for p? was first hypothesized by adding these simple errors onto p?∞.
A plot of p?∞ is provided in Figure 2.
4 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Having guessed at the formula using the above analysis, we now prove Theorem 1.1 rigorously. Define
functions:
qWk(n,m) :=
2k+1
n
− 2
3
22k+1 + 1
mn
(4.1)
qUk(n,m) := 1−
2k
m
+
2
3
22k + 2
mn
. (4.2)
By stitching these functions together, these define the total function q(n,m):
q(n,m) =

qWk (n,m) if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1
qUk (n,m) if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1
1 if n = 1
0 if m = 1
. (4.3)
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1 for some k. Then:
qWk(n,m) = max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
q(m, b)− n− b
n
q(m,n− b)
}
, (4.4)
and the maximum is achieved at b = 2k.
Proof. By symmetry between b and n − b, we assume without loss that 1 ≤ b ≤ ⌊ 12n⌋. We will show that
1− bnq(m, b)− n−bn q(m,n− b) ≤ qWk(n,m) for all possible bids b with equality achieved at b = 2k. Consider
the following cases:
Case I: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈W`,P2 with 2` < b ≤ 2`+1 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 .
We begin by simplifying:
1− b
n
qW`(m, b)−
n− b
n
qUk(m,n− b) (4.5)
= 1− b
n
(
2`+1
m
− 2
3
22`+1 + 1
mb
)
− n− b
n
(
1− 2
k
n− b +
2
3
22k + 2
m(n− b)
)
=
b
n
(
1− 2
`+1
m
)
+
2k
n
+
2
3
22`+1 − 22k − 1
mn
.
Since 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈ W`,P2 , we have 2`+1 < m here. It follows that for a fixed `, the above is a monotone
increasing function of b. We thus obtain an inequality by replacing b by its maximum value b = 2`+1, with
equality if and only if b = 2`+1:
1− b
n
qW`(m, b)−
n− b
n
qUk(m,n− b)
≤ 2
`+1
n
(
1− 2
`+1
m
)
+
2k
n
+
2
3
22`+1 − 22k − 1
mn
=
2`+1
n
(
1− 2
3
2`+1
m
)
+
2k
n
− 2
3
22k + 1
mn
.
This is monotone increasing as a function of 2`+1 since 2`+1 < m. To see this, notice that if we increment
` by one, the difference is:
2`+1
(
1− 2
3m
2`+1
)
− 2`
(
1− 2
3m
2`
)
= 2`
(
1− 2
`+1
m
)
> 0.
Thus this function is maximized when ` takes its maximum value. We notice that we must have ` ≤ k − 1,
since 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈ W`,P2 gives 2`+1 < m and 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Wk,P1 gives m ≤ 2k+1. Thus this function is
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maximized when ` = k−1, with equality if and only if ` = k−1. By inspection, plugging in ` = k−1, b = 2k
gives the maximum value is exactly qWk(n,m) as desired.
Case II: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 .
Consider here:
1− b
n
qUk(m, b)−
n− b
n
qUk(m,n− b)
= 1− b
n
(
1− 2
k
b
+
2
3
22k + 2
mb
)
− n− b
n
(
1− 2
k
n− b +
2
3
22k + 2
m(n− b)
)
= 0 +
2k
n
− 2
3
22k + 2
mn
+
2k
n
− 2
3
22k + 2
mn
=
2k+1
n
− 2
3
22k+1 + 4
mn
<
2k+1
n
− 2
3
22k+1 + 1
mn
= qWk(n,m).
Interestingly, this does not depend on b at all, and is always worse than qWk(n,m) by
2
mn .
Case III: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈W`b,P2 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈W`n−b,P2 , where `b = blog2(b− 1)c `n−b = blog2(n− b− 1)c.
Assume without loss that `n−b ≥ `b. As in Case I, because 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ W`n−b,P2 and 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈
Wk,P1 , we must have `b ≤ `n−b ≤ k − 1. But then we see that there are no values of b that fall into this
case at all, since we would have b ≤ 2`b+1 ≤ 2k and n− b ≤ 2`n−b ≤ 2k which, by summing, is seen to be in
contradiction to the fact that n ≥ 2k+1 + 1 from 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1 .
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1 for some k. Then:
qUk(n,m) = max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
q(m, b)− n− b
n
q(m,n− b)
}
, (4.6)
and the maximum is achieved at b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
.
Proof. By symmetry between b and n − b, we assume without loss that 1 ≤ b ≤ ⌊ 12n⌋. We will show that
1− bnq(m, b)− n−bn q(m,n−b) ≤ qUk(n,m) for all possible bids b with equality achieved at b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
. Consider
the following cases:
Case I: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈W`,P2 with 2` < b ≤ 2`+1 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 .
We start with Eq. 4.5 for 1− bnqW`(m, b)− n−bn qUk(m,n− b) and show directly that the difference from
qUk(n,m) is always positive. It is convenient to begin by multiplying out the common denominator:
nm
(
qUk(n,m)−
(
1− b
n
qW`(m, b)−
n− b
n
qUk(m,n− b)
))
= nm
((
1− 2
k
m
+
2
3
22k + 2
mn
)
−
(
b
n
(
1− 2
`+1
m
)
+
2k
n
+
2
3
22`+1 − 22k − 1
mn
))
= nm− n2k + 2
3
(
22k + 2
)− b (m− 2`+1)−m2k − 2
3
(
22`+1 − 22k − 1)
= n
(
m− 2k)− b (m− 2`+1)−m2k − 2
3
22`+1 +
4
3
22k + 2.
Now notice that since 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 , it must be that n− b > 2k and m > 2k. Thus the coefficient of
n is positive, so using n > 2k + b gives:
>
(
2k + b
) (
m− 2k)− b (m− 2`+1)−m2k − 2
3
22`+1 +
4
3
22k + 2
= m2k + bm− 22k − b2k − bm+ b2`+1 −m2k − 2
3
22`+1 +
4
3
22k + 2
= −b (2k − 2`+1)− 2
3
22`+1 +
1
3
22k + 2.
We notice now that it must be the case that ` + 1 ≤ k, because 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 gives 2k+1 ≥ m and
〈b,m, P2〉 ∈W`,P2 gives m > 2`+1. Hence the coefficient of b is non-positive, and we can use b ≤ 2`+1 to get:
≥ −2`+1 (2k − 2`+1)− 2
3
22`+1 +
1
3
22k + 2
=
2
3
22(`+1) − 2`+12k + 1
3
22k + 2.
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Finally, since `+ 1 ≤ k, define `+ 1 = k − c, where c ∈ N ∪ {0} and then write the above expression as:
= 22k
(
2
3
2−2c − 2−c + 1
3
)
+ 2.
By inspection, 232
−2c−2−c+ 13 = 0 for c = 0 and c = 1 and is strictly positive for c ≥ 2. Thus this expression
is always ≥ 0 and we have the desired inequality.
Case II: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈W`b,P2 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈W`n−b,P2 with `b = blog2(b− 1)c and `n−b = blog2(n− b− 1)c.
We have in this case:
1− b
n
qWk(m, b)−
n− b
n
qWk(m,n− b)
= 1− b
n
(
2`b+1
m
− 2
3
2`b+1 − 1
mb
)
− n− b
n
(
2`n−b+1
m
− 2
3
2`n−b+1 − 1
m(n− b)
)
= 1 +
4
3nm
− 2
nm
((
b− 2
3
2`b
)
2`b +
(
(n− b)− 2
3
2`n−b
)
2`n−b
)
.
So it satisfies us to minimize the function that appears:(
b− 2
3
2`b
)
2`b +
(
(n− b)− 2
3
2`n−b
)
2`n−b .
Since `b = blog2(b− 1)c, `n−b = blog2(n− b− 1)c we recognize this as f(b)+f(n− b) where f : N→ R is the
function f(a) =
(
a− 232blog2(a−1)c
)
2blog2(a−1)c. But now we observe that this function is convex. Moreover
this is a piecewise linear function and can be written as a maximum over a number of linear functions
f(a) = supi∈N
(
a− 232i
)
2i. Observe then that f(b) + f(n− b) ≥ f(⌊ 12n⌋) + f (⌈ 12n⌉). In other words the bid
b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
cannot be beaten. When we plug in b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
we get exactly the desired bound of qUk(n,m).
Case III: 〈b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2 and 〈n− b,m, P2〉 ∈ Uk,P2
There are no such values of b since we would have b ≥ 2k + 1 and n − b ≥ 2k + 1 from the definition of
Uk,P2 , which by summing is seen to contradict n ≤ 2k+1 from the fact that 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1 .
Remark 4.3. A careful reading of Case II of Lemma 4.2 reveals that for some values of n, there are other
bids b that match the performance of b =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
. Indeed, the function f is piecewise linear so when
⌊
1
2n
⌋
is
on the interior of a linear segment, other bids that have both b and n − b on the same segment will do just
as well.
Theorem 4.4. (Restatement of Theorem 1.1) We have that p?(n,m) = q(n,m) for all n,m and an optimal
bidding is b?(n,m) = 2k if 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1 and b?(n,m) =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
when 〈n,m,P1〉 ∈ Uk,P1 .
Proof. From Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we know that q and p? both satisfy the same recursion relation
from Proposition 2.4. We now prove that p?(n,m) = q(n,m) for all (n,m) by induction on the sum n+m.
Let As = {(n,m) : n+m = s} and consider the statement that p?(n,m) = q(n,m) for every for all (n,m) ∈
∪3≤s≤rAs. The base case r = 3 is clear since p?(2, 1) = q(2, 1) = 0 and p?(1, 2) = q(1, 2) = 1. Now suppose
p?(n,m) = q(n,m) for every for all (n,m) ∈ Ar ∀3 ≤ s ≤ r. We have then for any (n,m) ∈ As that:
p?(n,m) = max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
p?(m, b)− n− b
n
p?(m,n− b)
}
(recurrence for p?)
= max
b∈[1,n−1]
{
1− b
n
q(m, b)− n− b
n
q(m,n− b)
}
(by induction hypothesis)
= q(n,m) (recurrence relation for q).
The induction hypothesis can be applied since every pair (m, b), (m,n− b) has m+ b ≤ s−1 and m+n− b ≤
s − 1 since 1 ≤ b ≤ n − 1. By the principle of induction, this shows that p?(n,m) = q(n,m) for all
(n,m) ∈ ∪3≤s≤rAs and for all r ≥ 3. But ∪r≥3Ar covers the entire quadrant. Thus p?(n,m) = q(n,m)
for all n,m as desired. In light of p? ≡ q, Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 also show that b?(n,m) = 2k for
〈n,m,P1〉 ∈Wk,P1 and b?(n,m) =
⌊
1
2n
⌋
when 〈n,m,P2〉 ∈ Uk,P1 is an optimal bidding strategy.
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